OPINION: Putin Eyes Belarusian Protests in His Quest for Russian Expansion

Alex Missen (SFS ‘24) is a journalist for the Eastern Europe and Russia section and a guest writer for the Caravel's opinion section. The content and opinions of this piece are the writer’s and the writer’s alone. They do not reflect the opinions of the Caravel or its staff.

President Vladimir Putin of Russia with President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus in 2015.

President Vladimir Putin of Russia with President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus in 2015.

Protesters continue to rally across Belarus following the contentious reelection of President Alexander Lukashenko, with many calling for his immediate resignation. In Moscow, President Vladimir Putin may see this as an opportunity to expand Russia’s influence over a crucial region.

Following the collapse of the USSR, then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin met with President Lukashenko—the latter in the first of what is now six terms so far—to establish the Union of Belarus and Russia. Per the Union, the two countries remained politically distinct but introduced a free trade agreement and total freedom of movement of citizens across their shared border, similar to the EU Schengen zone. Later treaties, legally in effect but still unimplemented, sought to strengthen the bond between the countries by establishing a shared currency, mutual citizenship, and even a shared government. In the past few years, however, Lukashenko has sought to distance his country from an increasingly aggressive Russia and the depreciating rouble by seeking deals with the West and facilitating Belarusian nationalism.

Much of Russia’s oil exports to Central and Western Europe travel through Belarusian pipelines and are processed in Belarusian refineries. The currently uncompleted Nord Stream 2 pipeline, planned to funnel gas under the Baltic Sea from Russia to markets in Germany, was conceived by the Kremlin partly to reduce reliance on Belarus for oil transportation, but growing suspicions over the poisoning of Russian opposition member Alexei Navalny have soured German support for the project.

Strategically, Belarus has historically been used as a launching ground by all of Russia’s western adversaries, including Teutonic Knights, Poles, Swedes, French, and Germans. Its geography is comparable to a flat highway leading into the heartland of Russia; NATO presence in Belarus would be analogous to a knife pressed against Putin’s throat.

On August 27, Putin and Lukashenko held a closed-door meeting in Minsk. Following the meeting, Putin announced the creation of a Russian “law enforcement reserve” for use if “the situation gets out of control” in Belarus, a solution endorsed by Lukashenko. Lukashenko has made his position clear: if he needs Russian strength to secure his presidency, he will use it.  

Perhaps Lukashenko is wary of the fate that befell Ukraine, another former Soviet Republic seeking to establish its own national identity, after its pro-Russian government was ousted by one that favored joining the EU and NATO. Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula with the purpose of taking  decisive action before the region was lost forever. Lukashenko may emerge from the election crisis clinging to power; if so, he would know exactly where his debts lie, should Putin hold Lukashenko to his old promise of union.


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