Japan Considers Constitutional Change

On September 28, Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) announced that it had not recorded discussions regarding changing the constitution. The lack of records exacerbates foreign and internal debates over the country’s military future, adding to previously established uncertainty.  In July 2014, the government approved reinterpreting Article 9 of the document, which strictly confines Japanese military activity. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has always hoped to alter the document, saying to a House of Representatives Commission, “It is crucially important for us to make a new Constitution by ourselves.” Japanese officers aboard the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) training vessel JDS Kashima (TV 3508) stand in ranks after docking in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. May 4, 2004. (Wikimedia Commons)

Soon after World War II, the American military constructed Japan’s constitution with no input from locals.  While it has stood the test of time since then, Article 9 may no longer reflect changing political realities. It mandates that “The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right ... Land, sea, and air forces … will never be maintained.” However, Japan has maintained a fairly robust self-defense force. Abe has pushed to further unfetter its armed forces by promoting the rights of “collective self-defense,” which would allow Japan to use force to defend allies and when there is no alternative. The administration has only vaguely defined what collective self-defense entails, and the CLB’s lack of transparency leaves many wondering if a reinterpretation signals something more forceful than previous defensive measures.

To some on the mainland, Japan’s revision poses a security concern, and the lack of transparency surrounding the constitution’s alteration has contributed to hostile relationships with its neighbors. Without any indication of how Japan will reinterpret its constitution, China may assume the worst and respond with preemptive aggression. Xinhua, the official news station of the People’s Republic of China, reported that “Japan will risk losing the trust of the international community” if the government goes through with its plans to revise the constitution. South Korea similarly resents Japan’s status as a former colonial power. It has frequently asked the country to recognize its use of Korean sex slaves and for Abe in particular to apologize for Japan’s past behavior. For his part, Abe expressed “remorse” for victims of Japanese colonialism, but reaffirmed that Japan should not be “predestined to apologize.”

The international debates have reverberated to the local levels. Some worry that any incremental change will tie their country too closely to America, entrapping Japan in a binding alliance if the U.S. should go to war. A Kyodo poll found that in 2015, 60% of Japanese think the constitution should not change, a increase from 55% in 1994. Today, 32% believe the government should change the constitution, versus 34% in 1994. On the other hand, the Cabinet Office found that in 2015, 60% of Japanese were concerned with China, a 14% increase from three years ago. Moreover, 71.5% of respondents said they “were interested” in the Self-Defense Force. While it seems that citizens do not wish for a revised constitution, they are attuned to guaranteeing their security when confronted with a rising China. The CLB has not publicly indicated how it will reconcile these competing views, leaving the domestic audience unsure how Japan will navigate a desire for both peace and security.

The CLB’s failure to record government talks about reinterpreting the constitution only adds to the politically charged debate. While having made his ambitions for a more robust military force clear, Abe has not shown a way to reconcile the public desires for peace and security. While these desires may not be zero-sum, the CLB’s lack of transparency may lead to even greater tension than before between China and Japan.