Earthquakes Act as Catalyst for Syrian Normalization Talks

Bashar al-Assad meeting Putin in 2018 (Wikimedia)

Humanitarian aid to Syria’s rebel-held northwest has been slow to arrive as the devastating effects of the two major earthquakes that rocked the Turkish-Syrian border regions in the past three weeks continue to unfold. This has largely been due to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s reluctance to allow for the opening of additional humanitarian corridors across the Turkish border. Assad seeks to use the situation to his advantage and reintegrate his country into the region after more than a decade of relative isolation.

Although initially on the losing side of the Syrian Civil War and shunned by the West and other Arab states since his brutal crackdown on anti-government protests in 2011, Assad has turned  the tide of the war with the help of Russian and Iranian forces. As he has reasserted power over most of Syria’s major population centers and continues to besiege the rebel-controlled provinces in the northwest, Assad has increasingly pushed for the normalization of diplomatic relations with his neighbors. With the prevailing sense that Assad represented the only stable Syrian government, this effort has elicited positive responses in the region over the past few years. First, the UAE and Bahrain fully normalized relations in 2018, followed in late 2022 by Turkey, which took some — quite ambiguous — first steps towards peace with the regime.

The humanitarian need that arose from the February 6 and February 20 earthquakes in already war-ravaged northwestern Syria has played into Assad’s hands. Assad has actively limited humanitarian support to rebel-held areas, closing international aid corridors with the help of the UN Security Council vetoes of his ally Russia until only one crossing remained. At the same time, Assad has insisted on the sending of aid through regime-held areas in the so-called “cross-line” corridor, which has been subject to seizures and other disruptions at the hands of regime authorities. After the earthquakes, amidst an outpouring of support from fellow Arab countries, the regime has intensified its rhetoric on sanctions relief and normalization, arguing that Syria’s isolation is the reason why aid has been so slow to arrive in rebel-held territories.

In many ways, the situation represents an opportunity for both Assad and other states in the region: those governments that have either already actively engaged in normalization or those that have been flirting with it can now claim moral high ground by pointing out the successes attained by negotiating with Assad, such as the UAE’s recent nudging of the regime towards reopening humanitarian corridors. Assad, on the other hand, can use the momentum created by the catastrophe to ensure Syria’s reintegration into the region in the long term. The developments of the recent weeks in this regard have been remarkable: Jordan’s foreign minister visited Damascus, Egyptian President Al-Sisi called Assad on the phone, Assad visited Oman for the first time in more than a decade, and representatives from various Arab parliaments held a summit in Damascus. 

Given the Assad-regime’s track record on access to humanitarian aid, it remains doubtful if these dramatic steps towards normalization of relations and regional reintegration will end up supporting relief efforts in Idlib and the other rebel-held areas. Though countries now seeking relationships with the regime may condition their engagement on guaranteed humanitarian access, Assad’s desire to completely isolate rebel forces to consolidate his rule over Syria naturally disincentivizes any such concessions, despite the tremendous human cost of refusing them.